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MORRIS MYERS and 




HOWARD R. MORGAN 
and DAVID T. GREEN, 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 16991 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs initiated this action on December 14, 1976, 
for the balance due and owing on a Promissory Note dated 
September 1, 1974. The Promissory Note obligates Defendant 
Howard R. Morgan to pay Peggy A. Myers Three Thousand Seven 
Hundred Dollars ($3,700.00) in monthly installments of One 
Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per month. Defendant David T. Green 
did not sign the Note. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On May 31, 1979, Judge Banks heard the case and 
entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against both 
defendants in the amount of Two Thousand Five Hundred Forty 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Dollars ($2,540.000). (Reporter's Transcript at 43.) The sole 
basis of defendant-appellant David T. Green's liability was 
that Howard R. Morgan signed the Promissory Note as Green's 
agent. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). 
On July 21, 1979, appellant filed a Motion for a New 
Trial pursuant to Rule 59; a Motion to Amend or Alter the 
Judgment under Rule 59; and a Motion for Relief from the 
Judgment made under Rule 60. 
A hearin~ was held on the Motions on November 14, 
1979, where, as the Minute Entry indicates, the Court took the 
matters under advisement. On February 26, 1980, the Court 
denied the Motions and made a Minute Entry to that effect. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to reverse the judgment entered by the 
District Court against David T. Green. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs initiated this action for the balance due 
on a Promissory Note dated September 1, 1974. The Note, 
however, was actually signed in March or April, 1975. (Tre 
21). Howard Morgan signed the Note at the residence of the 
plaintiffs. Defendant David Green was not present at the 
execution and did not sign the Note. (Tr. 13). 
Under the terms of the Note, defendant Morgan agreed 
to pay Peggy Myers $3,700 in monthly installments. Subsequent 
-2-
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~ to the execution of the Note, Peggy Myers assigned one-half of 
her interest in the Note to Morris Myers. Morris Myers later 
assigned that interest to P. J. Pagores. 
On June 11, 1979, the Third Judicial District Court 
entered a judgment against the defendants for the balance due 
on the Note. In its Findings of Fact, the Court found: 
* * * 
5. Plaintiffs are the owners and holders 
of said Promissory Note. 
6. Defendants failed to pay the 
installments on said Promissory Note . 
7. On May 31, 1979, the principal balance 
remaining due on said Promissory Note is 
$2,540.00 
* * * 
9. Said Promissory Note is a valid and 
subsisting obligation on the part of defendants, 
individually and as partners • . • . 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Evidence at Trial was Insufficient 
to Support a Judgment Against Appellant 
David Green 
A. The Judgment from which relief is sought is a 
Judgment on a Promissory Note. The Third District Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law states that: 
3. Defendant, Howard R. Morgan, individually 
and for said partnership, and as agent of 
defendant, David T. Green, a partner, made, 
executed and delivered to plaintiff, Peggy A. 
-3-
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Myers, the Promissory Note received in evidence 
at the trial of this cause in consideration of 
loans and advances made to said partnership by 
plaintiffse • 5 • 
6. Defendants failed to pay the installments 
due on said Promissory Note when due so that the 
balance due on said Note is immediately due and 
payable .... ., 
9.. Said Promissory Note is a valid and 
subsisting obligation on the part of defendants, 
individually and as partners aforesaid, to pay 
to plaintiffs said principal sum and interest. 
It is thus clear that the Court below held appellant liable to 
plaintiffs on the theory that appellant was obligated under the 
Promissory Note introduced into evidence. 
B$ A party is not liable on any instrument 
unless his name appears on the face of it. Section 
70A-3-401(1) of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code provides: 
SIGNATURE -- (1) No person is liable on an 
instrument unless his signature appears thereon. 
This basic principle has been adopted, without exception, by 
every court considering the question. Fewox v. Tallahassee 
Bank & Trust Co., 249 S.2d 55 (Fla~ 1971); Jennaro v. Jennaro, 
190 N.W.2d 164 (Wise 1971); Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty 
Inc., 517 P.2d 1278 (Ariz. 1974); Bostwick Banking Co. v. 
Arnold, 178 S.E.2d 890 (Ga. 1970); Wiebke v. Richardson & Sons 
Inc.,, 265 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. 1978); Havatampa Corp. v. Walton 
Drug Co. Inc., 354 S.2d 1235 (Fla. 1978). See, also, 11 AM JUR 
2d, Bills and Notes, § 560. 
-4-
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Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty Inc., supra, is 
representative of this authority and is particularly 
significant since it arises out of a fact situation remarkably 
similar to the present case. In Ness, the plaintiff brought an 
action against Louise Ness, Ness Investment Company, Ness 
Finance Company and others for the balance due on a Promissorv 
Note. The Complaint alleged that Berth Ness, acting as agent, 
and on behalf of the defendants, made, executed and delivered 
to plaintiff a Promissory Note. Berth Ness' name was the only 
name on the Note. Plaintiff filed the Complaint and obtained 
service of process on the defendants. Subsequently, default 
judgments were rendered by the Court. The defendants moved the 
court to vacate the default but the trial court denied the 
motions. In reversing this ruling, the appellate court held 
that the defendants could not be liable on the Note, since they 
did not sign it: 
Nowhere in Appellee's [plaintiff's] 
complaint does it appear that the names of 
appellants appeared on the Note. Nor is it 
alleged that the Note in any way discloses that 
Berth Ness signed in any capacity other than 
that for himself individually. A suit may not 
be maintained or judgment obtained on a 
promissory note against an undisclosed principle 
whose signature does not appear thereon. 
Richards v. Warnekros, 14 Ariz. 488, 131 P. 154 
(1914); Plain State Bank v. Ellis, 174 Kansas 
653, 258 P.2d 313 (1953). See also, 11 AM JUR 
2d, bills and Notes, § 560. 
Id. at 1279 (emphasis added). 
-5-
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The appellate court in Ness, supra, emphasized that 
this rule applied even though the payee on the Note knew that 
the Note was an obligation of a nonsigning party. The court 
observed: 
The Official Comment found in Uniform Laws 
Annotated, Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-401 
provides: "(l) no person is liable on an 
instrument unless and until he has signed it. 
The chief application of the rule has been in 
cases holding that a principal whose name does 
not appear on an instrument sigqed by his agent 
is not liable on the instrument even though the 
payee knew when it was issued that it was 
intended to be an obligation of one who did not 
sign . n (emphasis added) 
Id .. at p. 1280 
Co An agent is personally liable on an 
instrument if he does not name the principal he represents or 
show that he signed in a representative capacity. The 
corollary to Section ?OA-3-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
is found in Section 70A-3-403(2) which provides: 
An authorized representative who signs his 
own name to an instrument (a) is personally 
obligated if the instrument neither names the 
person represented nor shows that the 
representative signed in a representative 
capacity. (emphasis added) 
This principle has also been universally adopted by the 
courts. Wolfe v. University National Bank, 310 A.2d 558 (Md. 
1973); North Carolina National Bank v. Wallens, 230 S.E.2d 690 
(N.C. 1976); Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty Inc., 517 P.2d 1278 
-6-
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(Ariz. 1974). The court's decision in Wolfe, supra, has an 
excellent application of this principle. In that case, the 
defendant Wolfe was a general partner in Watkins Glen Ltd. The 
partnership opened an account with the bank and entered into an 
agreement that checks were to be signed by Wolfe, Holtze and 
Altman. Later the agreement was changed to require that the 
checks be signed by either (a) Wolfe and Holtze or (b) Wolfe 
and Waymoth. 
Subsequently, 37 checks were drawn on the account, 
each check bearing only one signature. Relying on Section 
3-401-(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, the court held that 
the partnership was not liable for the checks, even though it 
was a partnership obligation. 
Watkins Glen's signature was comprised of two 
individual signatures as provided for in its 
contract with the bank. Consequently, since 
Watkins Glen's signature did not appear on any 
of the 37 checks in question, the partnership 
cannot be held liable on them, . . . 
Id. at p. 560. 
D. Parol evidence is not admissible to show that 
a party signed in a representative capacity. Under Section 
70A-3-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code a party is not liable 
for an instrument that he did not sign. To be liable on the 
instrument, his agent must identify the principal or otherwise 
show that he signed in a respresentative capacity. However, as 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Section 70A-3-403 indicates, if the agent does not do so, the 
agent is personally liable and there is not liability on the 
part of the principal. Further, parol evidence is inadmissible 
to establish the principal's liability or to otherwise alter 
the clear terms of the instrument. Trenton Trust Co. v. 
Klausman, 296 A.2d 275 (Pa. 1972); Bostwick Banking Co. v. 
Arnold, 178 S.E.2d 890 (Gae 1970); J. P. Sivertson and Co. v. 
Lolmaugh, 380 N~E.2d 520 (Ill. 1978). The court in Bostwick 
explains the principle this way: 
One who executes a note in his own name 
with nothing on the face of the note showing his 
agency cannot introduce parol evidence to show 
that he executed it for a principal, or that the 
payee knew that he intended to execute it as 
agent. e • • A court may take judicial notice 
that the signature of an inidividual on the face 
of a note, at the bottom on the right, without 
limiting or descriptive words before or after 
TI, is the universal method of signing a 
contract to assume a personal obligation. 
It is well established . . . that parol evidence 
is not admissible to add to, take from or vary 
the terms of an unambiguous written contract. 
[citations omitted] Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code enacted in Georgia in 1962, 'An 
authorized representative who signs his own name 
to an instrument ..• is personally obligated 
if the instrument neither names the person 
represented nor shows that the representative 
signed in a representative capacity.' 
[citations omitted] Even though the instrument 
may name the person represented, the one who 
signs in a representative capacity may still be 
personally liable on the instrument if by his 
-8-
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manner of signing he does not clearly inrlicate 
that he is signing in a representative capacity 
or if the instrument does not name the 00rson 
represented but does show that the sign~r 
thereof signed in a representative capacity. 
Id. at 893-894 (emphasis added). 
When there is an ambiguity appearing on the face of 
the document, parol evidence is admissible to determine the 
intent. However, the Code makes it clear that there is no 
ambiguity when a party signs an instrument without adding any 
description or indication that he is acting in the capacity of 
an agent. Therefore, parol evidence is inadmissible. Trenton 
Trust Co. v. Klausman, 296 A.2d 275 (Pa. 1972): J. P. Sivertson 
& Co. v. Lolmaugh, 380 N.E.2d 520 (Ill. 1978). The court in 
Lolmaugh explains: 
If there is a question as to whether or not 
a person signed as an individual or as an agent 
for a principal, parol evidence is admissible 
if, and only if, two criteria are met. First 
the action must be between the immediate parties 
to the Note.l Secondly, there must be some 
indication of the existence of a principal or 
that the signator signed in a representative 
capacity. 
lrt is interesting to Note that this proceeding is not 
between the immediate parties to the Promissory Note. Morris 
Myers was not a party to the September 4, 1974, ~ote. His 
interest arises by way of assignment. In Wood Press, Inc. v. 
Eisen, 384 A.2d 538 (N.J. 1978), the court held that a holder 
in due course of the Note, was not an immediate party and 
therefore not entitled to rely on parol evidence. 
-9-
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Id. at 522. 
From the foregoing, then, it can be concluded that 
Green is liable on the September 1, 1974, Note only if (a) he 
personally signed it; or (b) Howard Morgan signed it and 
indicated on the face of the instrument that Green was his 
principal and that Morgan was signing in a representative 
capacity. If Morgan only signed his name, Morgan is personally 
liable. Parol evidence is inadmissible to establish that 
Morgan was signing for some one elseo 
E. Appellant David Green is not liable as a 
party to the September 4, 1974, instrument because he did not 
sign it. The signator, Howard Morgan, alone is personally 
liable on the Note. The plaintiffs in this case have brought 
an action on a Promissory Note dated September 1, 1974. The 
sole claim for relief is the purported liability on the 
instrument. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in 
this case clearly indicate that Green's liability is limited to 
his liability as a party to the instrument. As previously 
discussed, this Note is, as a matter of law, not sufficient to 
impose any liability on David Green~ Reference is made again 
to Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty, Inc., supra. 
In Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty, Inc., the plaintiff 
filed a Complaint on a promissory note against a nonsigner to 
the note. An examination of the Complaint in that case and the 
-10-
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Complaint filed in this case demonstrate they arc virtua11y 
identical: 
Ness 
That at all times 
complained of herein, Berth 
C. Ness was acting as agent 
of and with the full authority 
to bind the defendants and each 
of them in connection with all 
complained of herein .. 
That prior to the 
commencement of this action, 
Berth C. Ness acting for and 
on behalf of the defendants 
and each of them, made and 
delivered a promissory note 
dated the 15th day of May, 
1969, in the sum of $25,000 
to the order of the plaintiff. 
Myers v. Green 
2. That at the time of 
the loans and advances herein-
above mentioned defendants 
engaged in business as a 
partnership doing business 
under the firm name and style 
of MGM Personnel Associates. 
3. Defendant, Howard R. 
Morgan, individually and for 
said partnership, and as 
agent of defendant, David T. 
Green, a partner, made, 
executed and delivered to 
Peggy A. Myers, a Promissory 
Note. 
The court in Ness held that the nonsigning parties were not 
liable because they did not sig~ the instrument. The court did 
indicate however, that plaintiffs "could have sued defendants 
on the underlying obligation for which the note was given, but 
this was not done." Id. at 1279. 
In the present case, defendant-appellant David T. Green 
may have had similar liability, but plaintiffs did not sue on 
the obligation underlying the ~ote. Like Ness, plaintiffs-
respondents' suit was brought and judgment was entered on the 
Note. Therefore, Green cannot, as the Uniform Commercial Code 
indicates, be liable. 
-11-
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Plaintiffs-respondents have not challenged the validity 
of the rules provided in the Uniform Commercial Code. They do 
not argue that the Code does not mean what it says or even 
suggest that the case law interpreting the Code is incorrect. 
Rather respondents allege that Green is liable because Morgan 
signed the instrument in a representative capacity, was Green's 
partner, and is therefore liable on the instrument under common 
agency principals. However, as previously discussed, (1) 
Howard Morgan did not sign the Note in a representative 
capacity; (2) since there is no ambiguity in his signature, 
parol evidence is inadmissible to establish that he was signing 
in a representative capacity, and (3) therefore, David T. Green 
is not liable on the instrument. 
F. The Judgment entered below ignores the 
essential distinction between a negotiable Note and an 
underlying obligation. It is important to emphasize that the 
Code does not prevent the payee of an instrument from 
collecting from a nonsigner in a proceeding based upon the 
obligation underlying the Note. Wiebke v. Richardson, 265 
N.W.2d 571 {Wis. 1978); Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty, Inc., 
supra; Mcclung v. Saito, 4 Cal. App. 3d 143, 84 Cal. Rptr. 44 
(1970); Potts v. First City Bank, 86 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1970). 
The court in Saito Notes the distinction this way: 
-12-
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The fact that they (the defendantsl had not 
signed the Note did not relieve them of their 
obligation to repay the consideration given for 
it. The law distinguishes between an action on 
a promissory note and an action to recover the 
consideration for which it was given (emphasis 
added). 
Respondents have failed to Note this obvious 
distinction. However, the cases cited in respondents' prior 
briefs clearly observe it, and by no stretch of the imagination 
do they stand for the proposition that David T. Green is liable 
on the September 1, 1975 instrument. In Salt Lake City Brewinq 
Co. v. Hawke, 66 P. 1058 (Utah 1901), the plaintiff brought an 
action to recover money loaned and for goods sold and 
delivered. It is important to emphasize the basis of the 
claim.- The plaintiff applied, by a letter to the plaintiff, 
for a One Thousand Dollar ($1,000.00) loan. In a second 
letter, he applied for an additional Five Hundred Dollars 
($500.00) and made an order for goods. While the subsequent 
passage of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code would invalidate 
any contrary holding or dicta in Hawke, the action brought in 
Hawke was not on a negotiable instrument, but rather for the 
obligation to pay for goods received and for money lent. The 
Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant could obligate the 
partnership for partnership obligations: 
-13-
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When, therefore, ... money is borrowed by 
one member of a firm on the credit of the firm, 
according to the usual course of its business, 
and within the general scope of its authority, 
the partnership is liable therefore. 
Id. at 1060. 
Clearly, as in Hawke, a signing partner to a sales 
contract can create a partnerhip obligation, or he can create 
an obligation to a nonsigning partner. However, that liability 
is based on the obligation, for the benefit received. Neither 
Hawke, nor any other case has held that a nonsigning partner 
can be obligated on an instrument he does not sign, when his 
agency does not appear on the face of the instrument. 
The case of Mccollum v. Steitz, 67 Cal. Rptr. 703 
(1968) is a perfect example of this. There the court held that 
a nonsigning partner could be held liable on a Note signed by 
his partner. However, his partner signed the Note and inserted 
the firm name and address after the signature. This is 
obviously a different situation from the present case, where 
Howard Morgan signed his name without any indication of 
agency. It should also be Noted that Steitz also recognized 
the principle that parol evidence is admissible to determine 
agency only if there is a patent ambiguity on the face of the 
document. 
Respondents have also relied on North Carolina 
National Bank v. Wallens, 230 S.E.2d 690 (N.C. 1976). In 
-14-
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Wallens, the bank had brought an action against partners un~0r 
an agreement wherein the defendants agreed in July of 1970 to 
guarantee and assume all future liabilities for debts of the 
partnership. Later in March, 1973, one of the partners 
borrowed money from the plaintiff and signed a Promissory 
Note. The Note was merely signed by G. C. Wallens. Neither 
the partnership name nor the name of the other partner was on 
the Note. On a Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court, 
relying on Section 3-401(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code 
found that the partnership was not liable on the Note. The 
appellate. court reversed this determination and held that 
although the Note was not enforceable, the guarantee agreement 
(the underlying obligation) was enforceable against the 
partnership. The court emphasized that the partnership was not 
on the Note: 
Defendant's potential liability had to be based 
on something other than that of a party to the 
note. That a nonsigner is ordinarily not liable 
'Orl"an instrument which he had not signed, 'does 
not mean that a nonsigner may not be liable 
under some other principle of law. It only 
means that the liability of the nonsigner is not 
as a party to the instrument. 
Id. at 692 (emphasis added). 
It is clear then, that under the Code, Green is not 
liable on the September 1, 1974 Note unless he signed it or 
unless Morgan signed it in a representative capacity. That 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
capacity, moreover, must appear on the face of the Note. Parol 
evidence is inadmissible to establish such capacity. The cases 
cited by both Green and the plaintiffs support these basic 
principles. Defendant Green has been unable to find a single 
case which holds otherwise. 
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